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Articles
Safe Consumption Sites and the
Perverse Dynamics of Federalism in the
Aftermath of the War on Drugs
Deborah Ahrens*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, I explore the complicated regulatory and fed-
eralism issues posed by creating safe consumption sites for drug
users—an effort which would regulate drugs through use of a
public health paradigm.  This Article details the difficulties that
localities pursuing such sites and other non-criminal-law re-
sponses have faced as a result of both federal and state interfer-
ence.  It contrasts those difficulties with the carte blanche local
and state officials typically receive from federal regulators when
creatively adopting new punitive policies to combat drugs.  In so
doing, this Article identifies systemic asymmetries of federalism
that threaten drug policy reform.  While traditional accounts of
federalism suggest that our constitutional culture provides a fer-
tile ground for experimentation and evidence-based decision-
making, the realities of drug policy and the legacy of mass incar-
ceration tell a different story:  overlapping regulatory authority
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research assistants, Austin Peril, Torri Pittman, and Alexandra Yerigan; the sum-
mer research series at Seattle University School of Law for feedback on an early
version of this project; and the Dickinson Law Review for conceptualizing and
organizing this engaging symposium.
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enables punitive creativity but disempowers or negates creative
pubic-heath and harm-reduction programs, such as needle ex-
changes and safe consumption sites.  This Article concludes by
warning that, if we are going to turn our states and localities into
true laboratories of democracy to develop solutions to the cur-
rent opioid crisis, we will need to take political, cultural, and doc-
trinal steps to disrupt the asymmetries of our drug policy
federalism.
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INTRODUCTION
Every generation brings with it a perceived illicit substance use
epidemic, and opioids are the noted drugs of the 2010s.1  Opioid use
dominates current debates around how to combat substance use
disorders, and policymakers at all levels of government are attempt-
ing to find a path out of overdose and addiction.  Some of those
approaches have involved criminal prosecution,2 which has been at
the center of the familiar story of drug policy over the past century.
Others have promoted education, treatment, and harm-reduction
techniques.  Part of the difficulty in finding effective solutions arises
from the concurrent jurisdiction issue:  because federal and state
governments maintain concurrent jurisdiction over criminal drug
offenses, the federal government must stand down for a state to
experiment with alternative approaches.  Further, for a locality
within a state to effect non-criminal-law drug policy, all three levels
of government would need to agree to a non-criminal-law ap-
1. For my takes on some of these episodes, see Deborah Ahrens, Methademic:
Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 810 (2010); Deborah
Ahrens, Drug Panics in the Twenty-First Century: Ecstasy, Prescription Drugs, and
the Reframing of the War on Drugs, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 397 (2013).
2. See infra Section III for an overview of two types of criminal prosecution
that states are using to address opioid substance use disorder.
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proach.  When a locality wants to, for example, set up a supervised
consumption site that would permit people to use injected drugs
with medical supervision to assist in case of overdose, that locality
must contend with two potential layers of opposition, both with the
power to prosecute.
While most criminal law is still governed by the state, federal
criminal law has expanded considerably over the past century.3
Laws criminalizing drug distribution and sales account for some of
that expansion, and drug offenses have been a particular focus of
federal law enforcement.4  Up until the late 1990s, this expansion
did not cause much conflict between the local, state, and federal
governments—while individual offices might squabble over appro-
priate approaches to specific cases, laws and prosecutors generally
combated perceived drug use epidemics with the application of
criminal justice.
However, by the late twentieth century, some jurisdictions had,
for various reasons, decided that prosecution was an inappropriate
approach for at least some types of drug-related offenses.  As I and
a number of other scholars have documented elsewhere, states and
localities started by softening laws or prosecution policies around
marijuana.5  Many jurisdictions effectively decriminalized posses-
sion of small amounts of marijuana as early as the 1970s, and in
1996, California became the first state to legalize the use of mari-
juana for medical purposes.6  In 2012, Washington and Colorado
legalized marijuana for broader recreational purposes.7
3. This expansion has engendered considerable criticism. See, e.g., Michael A.
Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Con-
trolling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 895–97 (2000) (summarizing criti-
cism of increased federal criminal law); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief:
The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1148–58
(1995) (describing the federal government’s war on drugs as the “single most sig-
nificant contributor” to a self-perpetuating cycle in which federal incarceration ex-
pands, and courts and agencies spend more time on federal criminal cases).
4. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.); Brickey, supra note 3, at 1148–58.
5. Deborah Ahrens, Retroactive Legality: Marijuana Convictions and Restora-
tive Justice in an Era of Criminal Justice Reform, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
_ (forthcoming 2020).
6. California legalized marijuana for medical use in 1996 via a voter initiative,
Proposition 215; about 55 percent of voters approved the proposition. See Califor-
nia Proposition 215, The Medical Marijuana Initiative (1996), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://bit.ly/37zq2B1 [https://perma.cc/7PUM-VJRY] (last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
7. See Aaron Smith, Marijuana Legalization Passes in Colorado, Washington,
CNN MONEY (Nov. 8, 2012, 11:46 PM), https://cnn.it/2V0np8S [https://perma.cc/
DNS2-8NLM] (indicating both states approved legalizing recreational marijuana
by ballot initiative).
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States and localities have not generally expanded that legaliza-
tion approach to cover other illicit drugs, but they have attempted
to deal with perceived epidemics of drug use with non-criminal-law
tools.  When methamphetamine became the perceived drug scourge
in the mid-2000s, states expanded drug education and experimented
with civil and regulatory approaches to combat drug production
and distribution.  For example, retailers were required to keep re-
gistries of persons purchasing pseudoephedrine-based drugs and/or
to hold those drugs behind the counter or in a locked cabinet.8
States took some similar approaches to dealing with a burgeoning
population of persons abusing opioids, like setting up secure drop-
boxes for unused and expired prescription medications.9
Federal authorities have not always been supportive of these
state and local initiatives to find new paths for addressing the use of
intoxicants.10  The early years of medical marijuana legalization at-
tracted federal law enforcement efforts,11 and, while federal law en-
forcement currently refrains from prosecuting state-licensed
marijuana dispensaries, the current presidential administration re-
scinded an Obama-era memo pledging restraint.12  However, the
administration has been less passive in its approach to localities that
currently are considering harm-reduction approaches to the per-
ceived opioid epidemic, such as supervised consumption sites.13
8. See Ahrens, Methademic, supra note 1, at 872–73.
9. See Ahrens, Drug Panics in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 1, at
426–27.
10. See infra notes 122–32 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
12. See Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen. of the
United States to All United States Att’ys, Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://bit.ly/3bRnVMn [https://perma.cc/684R-SB4R]; Laura Jarrett, Sessions
Nixes Obama-Era Rules Leaving States Alone that Legalize Pot, CNN (Jan. 4, 2018,
5:44 PM), https://cnn.it/2Pm4bXF [https://perma.cc/XQZ5-EZA8].  I discuss the
Obama administration’s Cole Memorandum in greater depth infra note 132 and
accompanying text.
13. Various sources and advocates use different titles for these sites, although
all generally mean to refer to the same sort of facility-supervised consumption
sites, supervised injection sites, safe consumption sites, safe injection sites, and
overdose prevention sites.  This Article uses the term “safe consumption sites” to
be consistent throughout, and because that title is more representative of how
these sites are described generally, which will hopefully make it easier for people
interested in the topic to find this Article.  Terminology may matter, however, and
it is possible that advocates should shift the common language—polling suggests
that public support for these venues is higher where the locations are described as
overdose prevention sites. See Colleen L. Barry et al., Language Matters in Com-
batting the Opioid Epidemic: Safe Consumption Sites Versus Overdose Prevention
Sites, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1157, 1157 (2018).  For a discussion of the federal
government’s intervention in local efforts to establish safe consumption sites, see
infra notes 52–75 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, many states and localities are strengthening
the criminal prosecution tools forged during prior perceived
epidemics and are applying criminal law in “creative” ways to effec-
tuate incarceration.  States prosecute pregnant and parenting
women for passing drugs to fetuses in utero, often under traditional
child-abuse statutes.14  States prosecute spouses, children, and
friends who hand drugs to their friends and loved ones under drug
distribution statutes; where the friends and loved ones overdose
and die, states prosecute them for homicide.15  Some of these prose-
cutions occur pursuant to laws originating from the War on Drugs
era.  But many occur pursuant to existing, non-drug-specific stat-
utes under circumstances that differ in degree and kind from the
offenses the laws were developed to combat.16  This creativity is not
novel—criminal statutes are often sufficiently broad as to plausibly
and appropriately include behavior outside of the core originally
contemplated.  But such creativity does demonstrate a significant
problem with developing effective drug policy.  Creativity in the di-
rection of more policing, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration
can take place without being effectively overruled by another level
of government.  On the other hand, creativity in the direction of
harm reduction or legalization is inherently fragile; it faces at the
least the threat and sometimes the reality that another level of gov-
ernment will use available criminal law to override the policy
choices of states or localities.
Stifling non-criminal-law alternatives makes it difficult for
states and localities to develop effective approaches for combatting
substance use disorders.  For opioid use disorders specifically,
opioids are used routinely and effectively in medical care and are
therefore likely to retain their legal availability.  This perceived
opioid epidemic has also pitted state and local governments against
one another as localities attempt to experiment with non-prosecu-
tion approaches,17 further demonstrating the difficulty of develop-
ing non-criminal law approaches as creative criminal law
approaches can continue unchecked.
Drug policy is—by choice or by necessity—entering an era of
experimentation and fragmentation.  Given the debacle of the-one-
size-fits-all mass incarceration approach that characterized the prior
era, our current tentativeness reflects a welcome humility and
14. See infra Section IIIA.
15. See infra Section IIIB.
16. See id.
17. For how these dynamics play out in the context of safe consumption sites,
see Section II infra.
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portends a more deliberative future.  This Symposium Article, how-
ever, strikes a note of caution.  While traditional accounts of our
federalism suggest that our constitutional culture provides a fertile
ground for experimentation and evidence-based decision-making,18
the realities of drug policy and the legacy of mass incarceration tell
a somewhat different story; overlapping regulatory authority en-
ables punitive creativity but disempowers or negates creative pubic-
heath and harm-reduction programs, such as needle exchanges and
safe consumption sites.19  If we are going to turn our states and lo-
calities into true laboratories of democracy20 to develop solutions to
our current opioid crisis, we will need to take political, cultural, and
doctrinal steps to break up the asymmetries of our drug policy
federalism.
I. THE CURRENT CRISIS
Opioids obviously are neither a newly created substance nor a
newly conceived public policy problem.  Concerns about opium use
kick-started the entire legislative approach to drug control in the
early twentieth century.21  Criminalization of drug trade and use ex-
panded throughout the century at the state level.22  The federal
criminalization of drugs expanded immensely when the Nixon ad-
ministration drafted the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) in the
1970s.23  Both state and federal drug law grew more punitive in the
1980s and 1990s, largely in response to a perceived epidemic of
crack cocaine and related racial panic about crack cocaine’s per-
ceived users.24  During that era, state legislatures and Congress cre-
ated new drug and drug-related laws, increased available
punishments for existing laws, and established mandatory minimum
18. For some of these traditional accounts, see works cited infra notes 113–17.
19. For my fullest discussion of these issues, see infra Section IV.
20. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“To stay experi-
mentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.  Denial of the
right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.  It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
21. As I have discussed elsewhere, and as historians of drug policy have docu-
mented, early drug policy in the United States responded to a perceived epidemic
of opium use; this epidemic was characterized in part as one generated by immi-
grants from China who would, among other things, seduce white women into en-
tering opium dens. See Ahrens, Methademic, supra note 1, at 849.
22. See id. at 850.
23. See Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see also Brickey, supra note 1, at 1148–58 (discussing
implications of CSA for federal criminal authority).
24. See Ahrens, Methademic, supra note 1, at 852–57.
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punishments for a number of offenses.25  But by the time these laws
were adopted, crack cocaine use already was on the decline.26  Now,
jurisdictions are using the laws they adopted in response to other
drug panics to respond to a number of newer perceived drug use
epidemics, including during the current crises centered around
opioid use.27
The opioid crisis has been framed differently than other al-
leged epidemics of drug use—rather than linking a prohibited drug
with a racial or cultural minority, media sources and politicians
have portrayed opioid substance use disorder as a problem af-
flicting white communities.28  Perhaps for this reason, all levels of
government have expressed more openness to the possibility of us-
ing public-health-oriented, harm-reduction approaches to dealing
with what they perceive as community crisis.29
While the public perception that a particular substance is pop-
ular  usually has lagged actual usage numbers,30 the number of
opioid-related overdoses continues to increase as national focus and
concern intensifies.31  Jurisdictions have put into place a variety of
25. See id. at 856–57.
26. See id. at 854.
27. See infra notes 58–59, 86–89, 106–09 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Anjali Om, The Opioid Crisis in Black and White: The Role of
Race in Our Nation’s Recent Drug Epidemic, 40 J. OF PUB. HEALTH 614, 614–15
(2018) (arguing that government characterizations of and responses to opioid use
disorders are colored by racism); Ashley Whelan, Former Gov. Ed Rendell is
Leading Nonprofit to Open a Safe-Injection Site in Philadelphia, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://bit.ly/2SMixSX (explaining his motivation for joining board
to open safe consumption site, former Pennsylvania governor cited the overdose
death of a prominent lawyer friend’s son who had developed an opioid use disor-
der following a lacrosse injury); Rick Jones, Crack Opioids, and the Modest Repa-
ration of Clemency, THE CHAMPION (Nov. 2017), https://bit.ly/33ze4H1 [https://
perma.cc/9JT4-BL2S] (contrasting the framing of crack cocaine use, inner-city
blight, and “crack babies” with current portrayals showing families and nice
homes).  That said, current portrayal of opioid substance use disorder still contains
a racial element; President Donald Trump, in speaking publicly on illicit opioid
use, placed heavy blame on Mexico and “sanctuary cities.” See President Donald
J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump on Combatting the Opioid Crisis, THE
WHITEHOUSE (Mar. 19, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://bit.ly/38IUDxs [https://perma.cc/
AB3N-8Z7Q].
29. See, e.g., Opioid Overdose: Promising State Strategies, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://bit.ly/2HEgmL0 [https://perma.cc/NC8Y-7RGK]
(last updated July 16, 2019); Joseph P. Williams, A Fight to Do No Harm, U.S.
NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019, 10:17 AM), https://bit.ly/38GeBJe [https://perma.cc/C954-
Z69Z].
30. See Ahrens, Methademic, supra note 1, at 854.
31. See generally Holly Hedegaard et al., NCHS Data Brief No. 329: Drug
Overdose Deaths in the United States, 1999–2017, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Nov. 2018), http://bit.ly/2uANTD4 [https://perma.cc/TT2X-RHT8];
K. Mack et al., Illicit Drug Use, Illicit Drug Use Disorders, and Drug Overdose
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policies that may or may not ameliorate the harms of substance use;
it is unclear whether overdose statistics would be even higher in the
absence of those policy measures.  But as overdoses continue to
climb, communities are seeing collateral health issues, such as HIV
transmission related to shared syringe use and other usage-related
infections.  In response, communities are exploring possible harm-
reduction approaches to opioid use, including the establishment of
safe consumption sites for persons who engage in injection drug
use.32  Communities are also exploring medication-assisted treat-
ment,33 broadly supplying Naloxone,34 and supporting syringe/nee-
dle-exchange programs.35
II. THE SUPERVISED CONSUMPTION SITE APPROACH
In January of 2017, Seattle became the first city in the United
States to announce it intended to open a legal36 supervised con-
sumption site.37  A number of other localities have followed suit in
Deaths in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas—United States, 17 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 3241, 3246 (2017); Michael E. Schatman & Stephen J. Ziegler,
Pain Management, Prescription Opioid Mortality, and the CDC: Is the Devil in the
Data?, 10 J. OF PAIN RESEARCH 2489, 2489 (2017).
32. See infra Section II.
33. See, e.g., Emily Boerger, House Passes Senate’s Comprehensive Opioid
Bill, MORNING WIRE (Apr. 18, 2019), http://bit.ly/2SpmKMj [https://perma.cc/
ZU4R-2SV2].
34. See Naloxone Program Case Studies, HARM REDUCTION COALITION,
https://bit.ly/2QBGGdE [https://perma.cc/54BN-AAWN] (last visited Dec. 27,
2019) (noting that about 200 communities nationwide have established take-home
naloxone programs).
35. The CDC’s information page on syringe/needle exchange programs offers
support for the effectiveness of the programs and notes that the decision whether
or not to establish such programs is made at the state or local level. See Syringe
Services Programs (SSPs) FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(May 23. 2019), https://bit.ly/2xO4N23 [https://perma.cc/C88X-R66Z].
36. Safe consumption sites already operate in the United States without legal
safeguards. See, e.g., Alex H. Kral, Addressing the Nation’s Opioid Epidemic: Les-
sons from an Unsanctioned Supervised Injection Site in the U.S., 53 AM. J. PREVEN-
TIVE MED. 919, 919–22 (2017) (studying participation at an unsanctioned
supervised consumption site at an undisclosed location in the United States);
“Dozens and Dozens” of Underground Safe Injection Sites in Seattle, MY NORTH-
WEST (Nov. 1, 2018, 3:43 PM), https://bit.ly/2vlsU78 [https://perma.cc/T3N6-386R]
(describing three different organized, underground types of sites in Seattle).
37. See David Gutman, Seattle, King County Move to Open Nation’s First Safe
Injection Sites for Drug Users, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017, 1:32 PM), https://
bit.ly/2Hh6abg.  Sites had been recommended by a county task force convened to
study solutions to opioid use disorders in the area and enjoyed support from the
mayor and county supervisor. Id.; see also Vernal Coleman, Open “Safe Places” in
Seattle, King County for Heroin Use, Task Force Says, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 15,
2016, 10:10 AM), https://bit.ly/3bzJ65x; Casey Jaywork, Sheriff: Safe Drug Sites
Users Would ‘Not be Arrested by Any of My Deputies’, SEATTLE WEEKLY (Mar.
31, 2016, 1:30 AM), https://bit.ly/37SRbyW [https://perma.cc/HZ9Y-5ZTE].  Seat-
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the past two years; some local governments have proposed to estab-
lish publicly-funded sites, while others have announced that they
intend to permit nonprofit organizations to establish sites.38  At
least six states to date—Maryland, California, Colorado, Massachu-
setts, New York, and Vermont—have introduced legislation that
would permit localities to establish sites, although no state has yet
signed a bill into law.39  Much of the battle over supervised con-
sumption sites mirrors that of syringe- or needle-exchange pro-
grams in the 1980s and 1990s.40
Supervised consumption sites do not supply illegal drugs to pa-
trons.41  Rather, the sites provide a way for people to consume
drugs they already have purchased under circumstances where it is
less likely they will experience harm.42  Generally sites will supply
sterile injection materials (particularly syringes), offer supervision
to reduce the chance of overdose, administer Naloxone during an
overdose, provide advice about safer consumption methods, test the
content of the illicit drugs, and provide information about and re-
ferrals to treatment programs; the provision of these services and
supplies is not premised on a patron agreeing to enter treatment or
become abstinent.43  While the Seattle site proposal discussed in
tle’s sheriff announced that local law enforcement would not arrest people who
used safe consumption sites. Id.
38. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
39. See Melissa Santos, Fight Over Safe Injection Site in Seattle Threatens
Opioid Treatment Bill, CROSSCUT (Apr. 19, 2019), https://bit.ly/31PaJTp [https://
perma.cc/383V-NMRG].
40. See, e.g., David L. Kirp & Ronald Bayer, The Politics, in DIMENSIONS OF
HIV PREVENTION: NEEDLE EXCHANGE 79–80 (Jeff Stryker & Mark D. Smith eds.,
1993) (noting that then-drug-czar Bob Martinez authored a federal report on nee-
dle exchanged that argued that “[t]here is no getting around the fact that distribut-
ing needles facilitates drug use and undercuts the credibility of society’s message
that using drugs is illegal and morally wrong”); Aubrey Whelan, Safe Injection Site
Uproar Reminds Rendell of Needle Exchange Fight 27 Years, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://bit.ly/3c1vAI2 [https://perma.cc/TCB6-6GYY] (quoting for-
mer Pennsylvania governor and Philadelphia mayor Ed Rendell with respect to
current safe injection site that his administration went through “the exact same
stuff” in establishing a legal syringe exchange program in 1992).  For a historical
snapshot of the evolution of law governing syringe and needle exchange programs,
see Scott Burris & Mitzi Ng, Deregulation of Hypodermic Needles and Syringes as
a Public Health Measure: A Report on Emerging Policy and Law in the United
States, 12 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 69, 84–95 (2001).
41. See, e.g., Larissa Morgan, The Regulatory Battle Over Safe Injection Sites,
REG. REV. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://bit.ly/37Cu63q [https://perma.cc/835F-N6HE].
42. See Sharon Larson et al., Supervised Drug Consumption: Evidence-Based
Public Health, HARM REDUCTION COAL. (Dec. 2017), https://bit.ly/37E854d
[https://perma.cc/2EL4-PLYA].
43. See, e.g., Leo Beletsky et al., The Law (and Politics) of Safe Injection Fa-
cilities in the United States, 98 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 231, 232 (2008); Elana
Gordon, Lessons from Vancouver—U.S. Cities Consider Supervised Injection Facil-
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this Article has contemplated the use of vans,44 supervised con-
sumption sites are generally bricks-and-mortar venues.45  Super-
vised consumption sites serve several related purposes:  reducing
the odds of overdose and death, preventing the spread of infection
(particularly HIV and hepatitis C), connecting individuals to treat-
ment, and removing drug consumption and related waste (such as
used syringes) from public spaces.46
While jurisdictions in the United States have only considered
implementing supervised consumption sites over the past few years,
such sites are not new in a global context.  The first supervised con-
sumption sites were established in the 1980s,47 and now, more than
a hundred exist worldwide—primarily in Europe, Canada, and Aus-
tralia.48  In fact, there is a well-publicized and studied supervised
consumption site in Vancouver, British Columbia49 less than 150
miles away from the proposed site in Seattle.  Empirical studies of
the efficacy of supervised consumption sites suggest the sites attract
users, reduce overdoses, and promote health care access without
increasing crime or drug trafficking in surrounding
neighborhoods.50
ities, WHYY (July 5, 2018), https://bit.ly/2V5VTqs [https://perma.cc/J4A5-H4CD];
Sharon Larson et al., Supervised Drug Consumption: Evidence-Based Public
Health, HARM REDUCTION COAL. 26–27 (Dec. 2017), https://bit.ly/37E854d [https:/
/perma.cc/2EL4-PLYA].
44. See Deedee Sun, Seattle Moving Forward With ‘Fixed Mobile’ Safe Injec-
tion Site, KIRO 7 NEWS (June 6, 2018, 6:46 PM), https://bit.ly/3a8Ufce [https://
perma.cc/R9HK-J856].
45. See Beletsky, supra note 43, at 232.
46. See Gordon, supra note 43.
47. The first supervised consumption site was established in 1986 in Bern,
Switzerland. See Do Safe-Injection Sites Work?, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://econ.st/39Pw69Y [https://perma.cc/57RF-HHQS] (noting that the site was
established to grapple with HIV transmission).
48. See Mattie Quinn, A Safe Space: Is the U.S. Ready for Its First Supervised
Injection Site for Drug Users? GOVERNING (May 2019), https://bit.ly/2SROHg1
[https://perma.cc/S56N-PDL2].
49. This location, Insite, was the first supervised consumption site in Canada
(launched in 2003). See Thomas Kerr et al., Supervised Injection Facilities in Ca-
nada: Past, Present, and Future, 14 HARM REDUCTION J. 28 (2017).  The site has
reduced overdose deaths in the area by 35 percent, according to scholars at the
University of British Columbia.  Brandon D.L. Marshall et al., Reduction in
Overdoes Mortality After the Opening of North America’s First Medically Super-
vised Safer Injecting Facility: A Retrospective Population-Based Study, 377 THE
LANCET 1429, 1429 (2011).
50. See generally Chloe Potier et al., Supervised Injection Services: What Has
Been Demonstrated? A Systematic Literature Review, 145 DRUG & ALCOHOL DE-
PENDENCE 48 (2014) (reviewing 75 empirical studies of supervised consumption
sites and summarizing ways in which sites have proven effective).
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But no such sites currently exist in the United States despite
efforts on the part of several localities and nonprofits to establish
them in major cities.51  The failure does not stem from lack of fund-
ing or commitment; rather, there are no supervised consumption
sites to date because, as this Article reviews, other levels of govern-
ment have intervened to prevent localities and nonprofits from set-
ting up services.
The most prohibitive intervention has been by the federal gov-
ernment, which has impeded localities from setting up sites and
scared states out of supporting them.  The federal government has
expressed that opioid use is a public health emergency,52 yet the
Trump administration has opposed the establishment of safe con-
sumption sites and has actively intervened to prevent localities from
establishing them.53  This opposition is not a foregone conclusion—
when communities began considering safe consumption sites, many
supporters believed the federal government would ignore them
much like legal marijuana.54  This optimism, however, proved
unfounded.
51. Seattle, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Boston, New York City, Denver, and
Burlington (VT) are all in various stages of establishing safe consumption sites
over the past few years. See Dominic Fracassa, California Bill Allowing San Fran-
cisco Safe Injection Site Reintroduced, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 4, 2019, 8:44 PM), http://
bit.ly/2HqqQNR [https://perma.cc/WRC2-7MGA] (noting that San Francisco’s
ongoing attempt to established a safe consumption site had been stymied in 2018
by the then-Governor’s decision to veto authorizing legislation); Natalia V.
Navarro, Denver City Council Approves Possible Safe Injection Facility, CPR
NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018, 7:28 AM), http://bit.ly/39A1WaG [https://perma.cc/6RY4-
7M2R] (noting that Denver City Council approves two-year pilot program but that
the program is contingent on state legislative approval); Jess Aloe, As Heroin
Overdoses Rise, Safe Injection Site Considered in Burlington, BURLINGTON FREE
PRESS (July 16, 2018, 12:37 PM), http://bit.ly/2wfwBvu [https://perma.cc/H8FF-
TFAE] (noting that Burlington City Council considering safe injection sites);
Christopher Robbins, NYC Plans Safe Injection Facilities  for Park Slope, Washing-
ton Heights, Midtown, and Longwood, GOTHAMIST (May 4, 2018, 2:57 PM), http://
bit.ly/2SvFie3 [https://perma.cc/9FKM-FEXB] (noting that Mayor Bill de Blasio
announced plan for city to create four-facility safe consumption site pilot pro-
gram).  So far, efforts to create safe consumption sites have concentrated in the
West and Northeast; although rising numbers of opioid overdoses are spurring
southern states to implement some harm-reduction programs like syringe ex-
changes, regional advocates are divided on whether or not safe consumption sites
would be politically realistic.  Max Blau, Southern States Slowly Embracing Harm
Reduction to Curb Opioid Epidemic, STATELINE (Apr. 15, 2019), https://bit.ly/
2wrJZx8 [https://perma.cc/CRF4-UENC].
52. Greg Allen & Amita Kelly, Trump Administration Declares Opioid Crisis
a Public Health Emergency, NPR MORNING EDITION (Oct. 26, 2017, 5:02 AM),
https://n.pr/3bHCQso [https://perma.cc/R3NV-VWQJ].
53. See infra notes 55–72 and accompanying text.
54. In Seattle, for example, the sheriff expressed he believed the federal gov-
ernment was unlikely to prosecute people for operating safe consumption sites.
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The federal government engaged in probably the highest-pro-
file intervention in Philadelphia.  There, the U.S. Attorney for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania sought to prevent Safehouse, a
nonprofit organization that includes former Philadelphia mayor and
Pennsylvania governor Ed Rendell on its board,55 from opening a
supervised consumption site in the city’s Kensington neighbor-
hood.56  While Safehouse had built support from a variety of local
stakeholders, including the city’s current mayor, district attorney,
and health department,57 the Department of Justice argued that the
so-called federal “crack house statute” prohibited the operation of
such a site.58  This questionable argument59 ultimately did not per-
suade the federal district judge who heard the case.60  But the real-
ity of—and specter of—federal prosecution has kept safe
consumption sites from becoming a reality in the United States.
See Sheriff Urquhart Expects White House to Attack Pot Before Safe Injection Sites,
KIRO 7 NEWS (Feb. 27, 2017, 10:04 AM), http://bit.ly/2UXQPEn [https://perma.cc/
585F-ZHQQ].
55. See Whelan, supra note 28.
56. See Jeremy Roebuck & Aubrey Whelan, U.S. Attorney Sues to Stop Super-
vised Injection Sites in Philadelphia, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 6, 2019, 9:30 AM),
https://bit.ly/33zRK02 [https://perma.cc/53G9-UEST].
57. See Nina Feldman, Trump Administration Is in Court to Block Nation’s 1st
Supervised Injection Site, NPR (Sept. 6, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://n.pr/2SQES0N
[https://perma.cc/DN7D-AUFM].
58. Because this is how people generally refer to it, this piece will refer to the
pertinent legislation as “the federal crack house statute.”  The federal crack house
statute makes it unlawful to “knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any
place, whether permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, dis-
tributing, or using any controlled substance” or to manage or control any place,
whether permanently or temporarily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee,
occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from,
or make available for use, with or without compensation, the place for the purpose
of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.
21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012).  In response to panic about ecstasy use at rave events in
the early 2000s, Congress amended the statute to cover temporary entertainment
venues.  Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools Against the Exploitation of Chil-
dren Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 608, 117 Stat. 650,
691 (2003).  The PROTECT Act’s coverage of temporary venues—to the extent
the crack house statute applies to any safe consumption sites—might be necessary
to cover mobile vans such as those Seattle has considered. See supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
59. For the definitive article explaining why the federal crack house statute
does not apply to safe consumption sites, see Alex Kreit, Safe Injection Sites and
the Federal “Crack House” Statute, 60 B.C. L. REV. 413, 467 (2019) (arguing that a
provision of the federal crack house statute immunizes officials who are enforcing
state and local laws relating to controlled substances and that this provision pro-
tects operators of government-run safe consumption sites).
60. See United States v. Safehouse 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 586–87 (E.D. Pa.
2019).
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The “federal crack house” statute is an excellent example of
law originally adopted in response to a different perceived drug use
epidemic to combat a substantially different problem:  Congress
adopted the law in 1986 to prevent landlords from supplying build-
ings to facilitate illicit drug use.61  Nevertheless, the federal govern-
ment has argued safe consumption sites represent the sort of harm
that the federal crack house statute contemplates—parties facilitat-
ing drug use through providing a venue in which it can occur.62  The
district court recently held that the “federal crack house” statute
did not cover safe consumption sites like Safehouse, arguing Con-
gress did not consider safe consumption sites when it adopted the
legislation decades ago.63  The district court engaged in painstaking
review of statutory construction to reach the conclusion that
Safehouse would not make a supervised consumption site available
“for the purpose” of unlawful drug activity.  Rather, the court de-
termined that, although Safehouse would know that drugs would be
consumed on the premises, facilitating drug use is not a significant
purpose for the proposed site.64  Instead, the significant purposes of
the site would be to provide sterile supplies and administer emer-
gency medical assistance.65  Although the district court ruled in
favor of Safehouse, the government may still appeal and has ex-
pressed its intention to use criminal law tools to prevent a safe con-
sumption site from succeeding.66
The interplay between the local and federal governments in Se-
attle has been similar, although the state/local dynamics are some-
what different.  After Seattle announced that it would try to
become the first city to host a supervised consumption site in the
United States, local politicians, police, and prosecutors bought in.67
However, several nearby suburban communities banned the con-
61. See supra note 59, at 430.
62. See supra note 57.
63. See Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 586–87.
64. See id. at 590–91, 595–98.
65. Id. at 614.
66. See Clary Estes, Philadelphia’s Supervised Injection Site is Safe for Now,
FORBES (Nov. 1, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2PgTkxS [https://perma.cc/672S-
TVF5] (noting the U.S. Attorney plans to appeal district court ruling).
67. See, e.g., Vernal Coleman, Threat of Federal Enforcement Complicates Se-
attle’s Proposed Safe Injection Site, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018, 7:11 AM),
https://bit.ly/2vaSg83 (indicated the site has support for site from Seattle’s city at-
torney and mayor).  Not all local residents support safe consumption sites; one
King County resident attempted by initiative to prevent the county from spending
public funds on safe consumption sites. Id. The state supreme court ultimately
held that the initiative could not be placed on the county ballot, as it fell outside
the scope of local initiative power. See Protect Public Health v. Freed, 192 Wn.
App. 2d. 477, 486–87 (Wash. 2018).
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struction of safe-consumption sites within their borders.68  The U.S.
Attorney for the Western District of Washington suggested he
would file a “federal crack house” statute lawsuit (analogous to that
pursued in Philadelphia) should Seattle attempt to launch a super-
vised consumption site.  The U.S. Attorney would similarly argue
that the site would violate federal law, although he conceded in ini-
tial interviews that he was unfamiliar with the mechanics of such
sites.69
Both of these U.S. Attorneys acted consistent with the stated
position of the Department of Justice:  in August of 2018, then-dep-
uty Attorney General Rod Rosenstein reminded states and locali-
ties that such sites violate federal law by condoning drug use and
failing to ameliorate the harms of substance use disorders.70  Fed-
eral prosecutors have issued similar reports and threats in other ju-
risdictions proposing safe consumption sites.71
As of this publication, it is unclear when and if Seattle, Phila-
delphia, or other localities may decide to proceed even in the face
of federal opposition.72  The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District
of Philadelphia remains committed to preventing Safehouse from
68. See Olga Khazan, Why Can’t Addicts Just Quit?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13,
2017), https://bit.ly/2wvDVDw [https://perma.cc/7VAG-NNPS].
69. See Mike Carter, Seattle’s New U.S. Attorney Says He Won’t Allow City to
Open Safe Injection Site, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019, 5:49 PM), https://bit.ly/
324EGze. (“While Moran acknowledges he hasn’t studied the issue, he said that
the idea of allowing people to inject toxic substances in a government-sanctioned
site, regardless of the availability of medical professionals, ‘is fraught with peril,’
and would violate federal law.”).
70. See Rod J. Rosenstein, Fight Drug Abuse, Don’t Subsidize It, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2HAfhUs [https://perma.cc/S9MY-BDNT] (arguing
that supervised consumption sites increase crime in surrounding neighborhoods,
encourage people to continue to use injected drugs, fail to facilitate treatment, and
create “a taxpayer-sponsored haven to shoot up”).
71. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Ver-
mont, Statement of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Concerning Proposed Injection
Sites (Dec. 13, 2017),  https://bit.ly/38DOmTs [https://perma.cc/MY6C-E2UH] (ar-
guing that a safe consumption site would stimulate the local market for opioids and
“encourage and normalize heroin injection”).
72. Seattle was considering proceeding with its proposed sites even before the
Safehouse decision and continues to consider opening sites in its wake. See Kipp
Robertson, Seattle Monitors Philadelphia Case After Judge OKs Safe Injection
Sites, KING5 NEWS (Oct. 4, 2019, 10:48 AM), https://bit.ly/39Uckdy [https://
perma.cc/VVG5-AV9U]; David Kroman, Seattle Officials Vow to Move Forward
with Safe Injection Sites, Despite U.S. Attorney Threat, CROSSCUT (Apr. 5, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2SzLP7d [https://perma.cc/TRM2-DR8A] (reporting that Seattle City
Council members suggest that a Seattle site should open despite federal threats,
arguing that the U.S. Attorney’s opposition is “not reason enough to walk away
from a proven public health policy”).
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opening a site.73  Even in the absence of permission to prosecute
under the “federal crack house” statute, the federal government re-
tains criminal legal tools that would enable it to stymie the success
of any safe consumption site.
The breadth of federal criminal law, combined with the rela-
tively small amount of actual federal enforcement, provides federal
law enforcement with an exceptional amount of discretion.74  Fed-
eral law enforcement agents generally do not prosecute individual
drug users or lower-level community dealers—perhaps because
they do not implicate federal interests and because of limited en-
forcement resources.  While possession and distribution of illicit
drugs are crimes that the states and the federal government could
prosecute based on most fact patterns, the federal government gen-
erally has not prioritized ordinary drug distribution and possession
cases.  Usually the decision to prosecute is left to the states.75
Not all inter-governmental tension over safe consumption sites
has involved federal challenges to local initiatives.  State govern-
ments also have opposed local safe consumption site initiatives,76
although this opposition often has stemmed from fear that the fed-
eral government will intervene to shut down sites.77  In Washington,
as the state considered legislation to address opioid substance use
disorders, some legislators attempted to amend the bill to prohibit
any localities within the state from permitting the establishment of
safe consumption sites; the legislation ultimately prohibited state
73. See supra note 66 (reporting that the U.S. Attorney plans to appeal dis-
trict court ruling, and Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen warns that “[a]ny
attempt to open illicit drug injection sites in other jurisdictions while this case is
pending will continue to be met with immediate action”); Christine Vestal, Phila-
delphia Could Become the First U.S. City to Host a Safe Injection Site for Drug
Users, USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2019, 9:47 AM), https://bit.ly/2HsUzWI [https://
perma.cc/R8QD-82RV].
74. See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Dele-
gation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 765 (1999).
75. See Brickey, supra note 3, at 1154.
76. See, e.g., Janie Har, Brown Rejects Supervised Injection Site for San Fran-
cisco, KQED NEWS (Sept. 30, 2018), https://bit.ly/38Bhx9Y [https://perma.cc/
S2TV-RL6F] (reporting Governor Brown vetoed state legislation to authorize pi-
lot supervised consumption sites in San Francisco).  Governor Brown further an-
nounced that “[f]undamentally[,] I do not believe that enabling illegal drug use in
government sponsored injection centers—with no corresponding requirement that
the user undergo treatment—will reduce drug addiction.” Id.
77. When public health advocates in Philadelphia banded together to create
Safehouse in 2018, Pennsylvania’s governor and attorney general announced that
they could not support the site because of the potential for prosecution under the
federal crackhouse statute. See Bobby Allyn, As Philly Moves Closer to Super-
vised Injection Site, Gov. Wolf Remains Opposed, WHYY (Oct. 8, 2018), https://
bit.ly/2P27J0M [https://perma.cc/57DL-ESAN].
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funds from being used either by safe consumption sites or entities
partnering with safe consumption sites.78  Several localities in
Washington have banned safe consumption sites within their
borders.79
The governors of California and Vermont both vetoed state
legislation that would have permitted the establishment of safe con-
sumption sites.  To some extent, those vetoes stemmed from con-
cern officials in localities that established safe consumption sites
would be subject to federal prosecution.80  So far Governor An-
drew Cuomo has failed to authorize New York City’s proposed safe
consumption sites.81  Thus, while formal federalism is still a bar to
safe consumption site establishments, the federal government is not
the only layer of government suppressing creative efforts.  The fed-
eral threat, as well as some separate concerns, motivate states to
prevent localities from experimenting as well.
The federal government, states, and localities all maintain
some level of jurisdiction over substance use through criminal ordi-
nances and statutes.  Therefore, if a state or local government
wishes to experiment with a public-health-oriented solution to sub-
stance use disorders, all levels of government have to agree that a
non-criminal alternative is appropriate.  Every level of government
needs to agree not to prosecute.
III. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: “CREATIVE”
PROSECUTIONS AND THE OPIOID CRISIS
Concurrent federal jurisdiction means that all levels of govern-
ment must agree to stand down from prosecution in order for a
non-criminal solution to be implemented.  But that same concur-
rence permits various levels of government to experiment with legal
approaches to combating substance use, as long as those ap-
78. See supra note 33.
79. See Kroman, supra note 72 (noting that several cities near Seattle—Fed-
eral Way, Bellevue, Renton, Kent, and Auburn—have passed ordinances banning
safe consumption sites).
80. See Melody Gutierrez, California Bill to Create “Safe Injection Sites” in
San Francisco Clears Assembly, L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2019, 5:38 PM), https://lat.ms/
2uJ2oVu [https://perma.cc/T6QL-YZVM] (noting that then-governor Brown ve-
toed similar legislation in 2018 due to concerns about federal prosecution); Mike
Faher, Safe Injection Sites “Not a Viable Option,” Governor’s Counsel Says, VT.
DIGGER (Oct. 15, 2018), https://bit.ly/2UXjhWT [https://perma.cc/J8P3-HSPJ]
(noting concern about federal prosecutions as a reason why the governor did not
support supervised consumption sites).
81. See Alexander Lekhtman, Pressure Mounts on N.Y. Gov. Cuomo to Au-
thorize Safe Consumption Sites, FILTER MAG. (Oct. 10, 2019), https://bit.ly/
39j5HAF [https://perma.cc/C9WY-AZ24].
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proaches are criminal law approaches.  This is not the first per-
ceived epidemic in which the states and localities have taken novel
criminal law approaches to curtail the harms of substance use.  In
fact, several of the tools described in this section were crafted in
response to former perceived substance use epidemics.  Some of
those tools had fallen into disuse but have been re-activated in light
of more recent social developments.  Most of this activity has been
documented in either academic literature or news articles, but it is
useful to summarize it in order to see the ways in which criminal
law can be created or stretched to cover novel situations.  While
there may be other areas in which state and local agents have en-
gaged in prosecutorial creativity, or where legislatures have gener-
ated new criminal law to offer prosecutors additional tools for
addressing substance use, this Article focuses on two areas:  punish-
ing women for drug use while pregnant and charging ostensible
drug dealers with homicide offenses.82
A. Prosecutions of Pregnant (and Parenting) Women
State prosecutors have, for the past few decades, used criminal
law to punish women who use illicit substances while pregnant.83
Sometimes, prosecutions represent the creative application of tradi-
tional criminal statutes to pregnant women, characterizing develop-
ing fetuses as victims of child abuse or homicide.84  Otherwise,
these prosecutions utilize newer laws adopted specifically to ad-
dress pregnant women who use illegal drugs.85
The perceived crack cocaine epidemic spawned a significant
number of changes in substantive criminal law and accompanying
punishments.86  One change I have documented in-depth elsewhere
is expanded prosecution of mothers, particularly of women while
pregnant.87  A major moral panic surrounding crack cocaine use
82. As I discuss infra at notes 106–11, the associates, friends, and family mem-
bers prosecuted for these homicide offenses fall within the broad technical cate-
gory of “dealer” as defined at law but often are not professional dealers as
contemplated by legislatures.
83. See Deborah Ahrens, Incarcerated Childbirth and Broader “Birth Con-
trol”: Autonomy, Regulation, and the State, 80 MO. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2015); Lynn
M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant
Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and
Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 246–48 (2013); Criminalizing
Pregnancy: Policing Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs in the USA, AMNESTY INT’L
(2017), https://bit.ly/2xtuZPo [https://perma.cc/7QZP-3TFX].
84. See infra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
86. See Ahrens, Methademic, supra note 1, at 856–57.
87. Id. at 858–59.
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was the notion of the so-called “crack baby”—a baby born to a
woman who had a cocaine substance use disorder that is limited for
life by the effects of cocaine on development within the womb.88  In
retrospect, these fears were wildly overblown and unfounded, par-
ticularly when the effects of cocaine use by pregnant women were
isolated from the effects of poverty and distinguished from the
more widespread effects of tobacco and alcohol use.89  Neverthe-
less, the law responded.  Many district attorney’s offices began ap-
plying existing homicide and child-abuse statutes to women who
experienced stillbirth or had babies who tested positive for co-
caine.90  These cases raised issues related to proximate causation.  It
was often difficult or even impossible for medical experts to deter-
mine to what extent a person’s substance use led to negative fetal
outcomes;91 and, by the time a perceived epidemic of
methamphetamine use arose in the mid-2000s, legal advocates and
medical experts mobilized to try to persuade prosecutors and legis-
lators against expanding criminal law and creating or amending new
statutes.92
Despite those efforts to better educate prosecutors and prevent
such prosecutions, prosecutors have been leveraging existing homi-
cide and child-abuse statutes against women who use opioids while
88. See, e.g., Dana Hirschenbaum, When Crack is the Only Choice: The Effect
of a Negative Right of Privacy on Drug-Addicted Women, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S
L.J. 327, 327–28 (2000) (describing efforts communities made to combat this per-
ceived issue).
89. See Susan Okie, The Epidemic that Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2009),
https://nyti.ms/2Hmc3DX [https://perma.cc/N5CG-N3PL].
90. See, e.g., Laura E. Gomez, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS,
PROSECUTORS, AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 78 (1997).  One
public hospital in South Carolina, with heavy involvement from law enforcement,
began a systematic program in which women suspected of cocaine use during preg-
nancy were subject to drug screening at the hospital; factors that hospital person-
nel used to screen women for testing included low-birthweight babies and lack of
prenatal care.  Women who tested positive were subject to arrest and prosecution.
The Supreme Court held that the program violated the fourth amendment rights of
women subjected to testing; the fact that law enforcement dominated program de-
sign and women experienced arrest meant that the regime did not fit within the
“special needs” category. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84
(2001); see also McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d 354, 357 (S.C. 2008) (overturning
McKnight’s homicide conviction for child abuse, after she used crack cocaine and
her infant was still born, based on ineffective assistance of counsel).
91. See, e.g., McKnight, 661 S.E.2d at 357–61 (detailing the many ways in
which McKnight’s counsel failed to address possible causation issues in represent-
ing her for her homicide by child abuse charge).
92. See, e.g., Doris Marie Provine, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR
ON DRUGS 165–66 (2007); Meth and Myth: Top Doctors, Scientists and Specialists
Warn Mass Media on “Meth Baby” Stories, STOP THE DRUG WAR (July 29, 2005),
https://bit.ly/38t8Cr4 [https://perma.cc/3QC4-SX4D].
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pregnant, even though such statutes often were not drafted with
fetuses in mind.93  Legislatures have also drafted new statutes
criminalizing opioid use while pregnant.94  In contrast, obstetricians
support providing women who use opioid with supportive therapy
during pregnancy.95  Several major medical associations have re-
leased statements opposing the prosecution of pregnant women
who use illicit drugs.96  Prosecutions also appear to increase, not
decrease, the number of babies who are born with neonatal absti-
nence syndrome.97  In other words, while there is empirical support
for the idea that safe consumption sites reduce the collateral harms
of opioid substance use disorder, prosecuting women who use
opioids during pregnancy seems to increase them.  Nevertheless,
because of the perverse federalism dynamics detailed in this Arti-
cle, states and localities are free to experiment with punitive solu-
tions to opioid misuse.
93. See Erica Hensley & Michelle Liu, Delivering Justice, MISS. TODAY (May
12, 2019), https://bit.ly/39wXxFt [https://perma.cc/EE3M-WMJW] (documenting
prosecutions of pregnant women for felony child abuse where they tested positive
for opioids and other drugs and describing this as a “novel interpretation of the
law”); Matt Payne, District Attorney, County Entities Actively Target Pregnant
Drug-Abusers, DAILY ARDMOREITE (Dec. 4, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://bit.ly/
2ORof3S [https://perma.cc/GG6R-KGRP] (explaining a county prosecutor charg-
ing women who used opioids while pregnant with child neglect); see also Alex Wig-
glesworth, Her Baby Was Stillborn Because of Meth, Police Say. Now She’s
Charged with Murder, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2019, 12:31 PM), https://lat.ms/
2OVKrcS [https://perma.cc/4DKC-8XUM] (explaining a murder prosecution
where a woman gave birth to a stillborn baby and used methamphetamine while
pregnant).  This article quotes National Advocates for Pregnant Women director
Lynn M. Paltrow as saying that she was “seeing an increasing number of women
who are arrested for experiencing miscarriages and stillbirths[.]” Id.
94. See Melissa Healy, When Pregnant Women Who Use Opioids are Treated
like Criminals, Their Babies Suffer, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://
lat.ms/2uHakq7 [https://perma.cc/J9RX-NFSV] (noting that, in response to the
opioid epidemic, 13 states have created new laws criminalizing using illicit drugs
while pregnant).
95. See Comm. on Obstetric Prac., Opioid Use Disorder and Pregancy, AM.
COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Aug. 2017), https://bit.ly/
33Cc8NY [https://perma.cc/N2PT-3A9K].
96. For a collection of such statements, including from the American Medical
Association and the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists, see Medi-
cal and Public Health Group Statements, NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT
WOMEN  (June 2018), https://bit.ly/3buA1uD [https://perma.cc/7AAN-75KL].
97. See Laura J. Faherty et al., Association of Punitive and Reporting State
Policies Related to Substance Use in Pregnancy with Rates of Neonatal Abstinence
Syndrome, JAMA NETWORK (Nov. 13, 2019), https://bit.ly/2SBGZW7 [https://
perma.cc/7YH6-QJRK].
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B. Homicide Prosecutions
Homicide is a second area where states have utilized strategies
from prior perceived drug epidemics or have used existing criminal
law to creatively prosecute people.98  State prosecutors increasingly
file homicide charges where a person dies from a drug overdose.99
In the past few years, state level overdose-related prosecutions ap-
pear to have at least doubled,100 and in some jurisdictions, the rates
have multiplied much faster.101  Prosecutors often express frustra-
tion about the number of overdose deaths, and they reason that
homicide prosecutions are a way to hold someone accountable for
the death.
There are two primary types of overdose-related homicide
prosecutions.  First, many prosecutors simply use traditional homi-
cide statutes to prosecute people who give friends or family mem-
bers opioids where the user overdoses and dies.  A significant
percentage of people who use opioids non-medically receive them
from friends or relatives.102  In such cases, the prosecutor proceeds
on an unintentional homicide theory; the charge might be involun-
tary manslaughter (due to negligence with respect to the person’s
death), implied malice murder (where the defendant acted with de-
praved indifference to human life), or even felony murder (where
the predicate felony would be drug distribution).103  Although not
98. For an overview of drug-induced homicide statutes and prosecutions, see
Leo Beletsky, America’s Favorite Antidote: Drug-Induced Homicide in the Age of
the Overdose Crisis, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 833 (2019).  For an excellent summary of
the issues in drug-induced homicide prosecutions, see Valena E. Beety et al., Drug-
Induced Homicide: Challenges and Strategies in Criminal Defense, 70 S.C. L. REV.
707 (2019).
99. See Rosa Goldensohn, They Shared Drugs. Someone Died. Does that
Make Them Killers?, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://nyti.ms/3bg4ATJ [https://
perma.cc/XND8-KDZS] (describing cases where people were charged with murder
after sharing a fentanyl patch with a fiancé; buying heroin that turned out to be
fentanyl with a girlfriend; sharing drugs purchased on the internet with an older
brother; and using drugs with a girlfriend).
100. Id.; see also Beletsky, supra note 98, at 837 (estimating that such prosecu-
tions have in fact at least tripled).
101. See supra note 99 (noting that “murder by overdose” cases have quadru-
pled in Minnesota over the past decade and that Pennsylvania went from 4 to 171
cases from 2011 to 2018 after legal changes made overdose homicides easier to
prosecute).
102. See Raminta Daniulaityte et al., Sources of Pharmaceutical Opioids for
Non-Medical Use Among Young Adults, 46 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 198, 204
(2014) (noting that about 40% of participants in survey had obtained opioids for
free from friends or relatives).
103. See supra note 99.
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all attempts to prosecute under these theories have succeeded,104
the ability to bring charges at all undoubtedly produces pleas.  Fur-
ther, being prosecuted for a homicide offense is itself an extraordi-
nary experience.  The drug distribution relied upon by prosecutors
can include circumstances where money is exchanged.  But distribu-
tion also includes situations where individuals simply share his or
her stash with a friend or family member or where an individual
serves as the point person to procure drugs for a group of people
intending to share in the bounty.105  While homicide statutes were
not drafted with the distribution of drugs in mind (as homicide is a
traditional common-law offense, and there was no such thing as an
illegal drug until the twentieth century), this is a creative tool that
states and localities have employed without federal interference.
Governments may be limited by other provisions of criminal law or
by court interpretations of that law but not by the intercession of
other layers of government.
Relatedly, in twenty states (and under federal law), prosecu-
tors have specific drug-induced homicide statutes, otherwise known
as “Len Bias laws.”106  While these statutes were drafted primarily
to address the harms caused by persons central to the illicit drug
trade, the State is often including people who distribute drugs by
giving them to friends and family or buying them on behalf of those
associates.107  States are not stretching the legal definition of “distri-
bution” in doing so—it includes situations where a friend hands
104. See, e.g., Walmsley v. State, 131 N.E. 3d 768, 773–74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)
(dismissing the charge where the prosecutor charged a man with felony murder
after he injected his wife with heroin); State v. Shell, 501 S.W.3d 22, 29–32 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2016) (reversing voluntary manslaughter conviction because court deter-
mined the defendant did not have a duty to seek medical care for the friend who
overdosed on heroin that he provided).
105. Drug distribution statutes generally do not require that a person who is
charged be a person who sells illicit substances as a professional; distribution
broadly covers people who transfer drugs to others. See, e.g., Long v. United
States, 623 A.2d 1144, 1151 (D.C. 1993) (holding that distribution covers circum-
stance where one person uses money pooled from friends to purchase drugs for a
group with intent to give the friends drugs once purchased); Rosa Goldensohn,
You’re Not a Drug Dealer? Here’s Why the Police Might Disagree, N.Y. TIMES
(May 25, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2SGVOGN [https://perma.cc/ULE6-M7LS] (pro-
viding an overview of drug-sharing circumstances considered to be distribution in
criminal law).  Many jurisdictions do have a joint-user defense that applies when
two people purchase drugs together for joint use, although both people may need
to be present. See, e.g., State v. Morrison, 902 A.2d 860, 866–71 (N.J. 2006) (up-
holding dismissal of distribution and drug-induced homicide charges in case where
trial court determined defendant was a joint user).
106. See Beety, supra note 98, at 710–11 (noting that almost half of states
have such statutes).
107. See supra note 99; Beletsky, supra note 98, at 869–75.
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over drugs without payment.108  Prosecutors are exercising discre-
tion, however, to prosecute people by inaccurately describing joint
users as drug distributors.109  Good Samaritan laws offer some lim-
ited protections to persons present at the scene of an overdose—
forty states recognize that prosecuting individuals who are present
may deter them from seeking assistance when a person overdoses
or might cause them to abandon the person entirely.  However,
these laws usually only protect people from being charged with pos-
session of an illegal drug or provide an affirmative defense to prose-
cution for possession.110  Good Samaritan laws generally do not
shield people from punishment where a prosecutor seeks to bring
homicide charges.111
The perverse pressures of federalism therefore favor criminal-
ization.  There is not an easy doctrinal way around this problem.
And, to the extent that we might be tempted to aggressively argue
that the federal government should defer to state and local inter-
ests, that approach might have less desirable effects in other police
areas.  The federal government can, of course, voluntarily desist
from enforcing existing criminal law.  Criminal law does not self-
execute—it reflects the discretionary decisions of the persons en-
trusted to enforce it.112  There are certainly times we might be con-
cerned that prosecutors are exercising that discretion questionably,
particularly where the discretion is exercised in ways that discrimi-
nate against traditionally disfavored subgroups.
108. Cf. Antonia Noori Farzan, She Shared Heroin with a Friend Who Fatally
Overdosed. She’ll Now Spend 21 Years in Prison, WASH. POST (May 30, 2019, 5:46
AM), https://wapo.st/3bCDuXS [https://perma.cc/6LXC-LG32] (describing similar
federal prosecution for distribution of heroin resulting in death under a federal
statute with a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence; the defendant purchased and
used heroin with the victim and left her in a KFC restroom).
109. See Beety, supra note 98, at 738–39 (noting that the majority of persons
charged in drug-induced homicide cases are fellow users, rather than people gener-
ally involved in the illegal drug trade).
110. See Nicole Schill, Note, The Fatal Shortcomings of Our Good Samaritan
Overdose Statutes and Proposed Model Statute, 25 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. &
SOC. JUST. 123, 126, 139 (2018).  Such statutes generally do not provide immunity
against or a defense to prosecution for distribution offenses. See id. at 145.
111. Only Vermont and Delaware provide more comprehensive immunity.
See Good Samaritan Fatal Overdose Prevention Laws, DRUG POL’Y ALL., https://
bit.ly/2SH3o47 [https://perma.cc/Z48N-6YLN] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
112. See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 18 (2007) (stating that prosecutors have vast discretion-
ary power that is largely unreviewed).
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IV. THE PERVERSE DYNAMICS OF FEDERALISM IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE WAR ON DRUGS
Advocates for robust federalism have long offered a stylized
list of arguments in favor of state and local autonomy.113  First, fed-
eralism is said to maximize the number of people who can realize
their preferences as natural local majorities adopt different rules
and policies, and dissenters vote with their feet to join more appeal-
ing communities.114  Second, federalism serves to encourage par-
ticipatory democracy, as decisions affecting people’s lives are made
closer to home and in smaller groups.115  Third, federalism is meant
to diffuse power, thereby reducing the risk of tyranny and creating
conditions in which liberty can flourish.116  Finally, as Justice Bran-
deis famously suggested, federalism allows states to serve as labora-
tories of democracy.  They may pilot programs that, if effective, can
be expanded more broadly.117
The dynamics of drug regulation under contemporary federal-
ism doctrine make the achievement of each of these objectives im-
possible.  Some of federalism’s ostensible objectives are expressly
undercut by the actual operation of federalism in this arena.  For
example, the ability of two (and sometimes three or more) levels of
government to independently impose criminal sanctions upon drug-
related behavior, and to use those criminal laws to unilaterally veto
harm-reduction approaches to drug policy, ensures that large
swathes of the country who want to reduce criminal penalties,
decriminalize certain drugs, and shift drug policy paradigm cannot
actualize their preferences.  This is so even in areas where those
swathes constitute a substantial majority of the population.118  Simi-
larly, the independent authority of each level of government to im-
pose incarcerative sentences and thwart popular reform efforts
means that, in the drug policy context, federalism undercuts rather
113. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–60 (1991); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1768–69
(2006); see also generally Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994) (laying out arguments
in great detail while also sharply and humorously critiquing them).
114. See generally, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expendi-
tures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (offering a classic example).
115. See, e.g., DAVID SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91–92 (1995).
116. For James Madison’s version of this argument, see THE FEDERALIST NO.
51 (James Madison).  For a modern scholarly take, see Andrzej Rapaczynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT.
REV. 341, 380–95 (1985).
117. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J, dissenting).
118. See generally Section II supra.
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than enhances liberty—whether liberty is defined as individual free-
dom from excessive restraint119 or as a collective ability to actively
pursue a particular vision of the good life.120
Other objectives of federalism are not so much undercut as
they are warped by the dynamics of drug regulation.  As discussed
throughout this Article, drug policy federalism allows those who
want to impose creative prosecutorial approaches the ability to ex-
periment.  But federalism snuffs out all states’ attempts to serve as
laboratories for harm-reduction and other non-criminal approaches
to drug policy.121  Similarly, small local groups who favor aggressive
use of existing laws to prosecute drug offenders or oppose the crea-
tion of safe consumption sites in their neighborhoods have the abil-
ity to influence drug policy-making at the local level.  Ultimately,
those who advocate for alternative approaches are required to or-
ganize and/or persuade at the national level.122
As this Article has noted, safe consumption sites are hardly the
first battlefield for federal versus state or local interests in the arena
of drug criminalization.123  When states began legalizing marijuana
for medical use in 1996, the federal government prosecuted busi-
nesses and individuals who sold and possessed marijuana, although
resource constraints made it difficult or impossible for the federal
government to stamp out medical marijuana.124  At this point, the
federal government appears to have reached a fragile decision not
to prosecute marijuana offenses in jurisdictions that have legalized
its use.125
119. See generally, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); JOHN STU-
ART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
120. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEM-
OCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005).
121. Compare Section II supra (documenting difficulty of adopting creative
approaches that focus on harm reduction) with Section III supra (documenting
ease with which localities pursue creative prosecutorial strategies).
122. For the consequences of failing to win support at the national level, see
Sessions, supra note 12 (revoking Obama-era guidance protecting state-authorized
marijuana buyers and sellers from federal prosecution); see also supra note 57
(noting Justice Department actions to block proposed safe-consumption site under
federal law).
123. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
124. See Alex Kreit, Reflections on Medical Marijuana Prosecutions and the
Duty to Seek Justice, 89 DENV. L. REV. 1027, 1033–41 (2012) (documenting federal
enforcement efforts in medical marijuana context); Robert A. Mikos, On the Lim-
its of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize
Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1482 (2009).
125. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
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But the federal government has made a markedly different de-
cision thus far on safe consumption sites.126  It is reasonably clear
that federal courts may end up going the Safehouse127 route.
Courts may decide to constrain the federal government from en-
forcing the “federal crack house” statute against states and locali-
ties that wish to establish safe consumption sites—such a decision
would be based on interpreting the statute in a way that does not
cover such sites.128  However, courts are not going to prevent the
federal government from using provisions of the CSA to prosecute
people who plan to enter safe consumption sites to use drugs they
have purchased elsewhere.129  It is too early to be confident that
other federal courts will indeed follow the Safehouse court’s lead.
Still, it is possible that federal courts will, at the least, prevent fed-
eral prosecutors from wielding the “federal crack house” statute to
stop states and localities from establishing safe consumption sites in
the first place.  This would hopefully provide states and localities
with the encouragement they need and with relief from concerns
about federal prosecution for sites the states authorize or fund.130
Federal executive restraint may be a problematic strategy for
other reasons but would be a less conditional path forward.  One
way in which the perverse federalism problem could be curtailed
(familiar territory for DOJ) is through the adoption of federal pros-
ecution principles or guidelines that are consistent with permitting
state experimentation with safe consumption sites.131  The Obama
Administration’s Cole memorandum132 offers a reasonable
126. See supra notes 52–75 and accompanying text.
127. United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
128. See id.
129. See George D. Brown, Counterrevolution?—National Criminal Law Af-
ter Raich, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 972–73 (2005) (noting that the Court in Gonzalez
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) held that a state’s decision to legalize medical mari-
juana did not displace pertinent provisions of the federal CSA, meaning that states
cannot override federal criminal law).
130. See supra notes 55–59 (explaining that some states are reluctant to au-
thorize safe consumption sites in whole or in part because of the threat of prosecu-
tion under the federal crack house statute).
131. The executive branch may be best situated to address the problems with
expansive federal criminal law, as the judiciary has been reluctant to do so because
of the Commerce Clause, and as Congress may be constrained by the broad way in
which it drafts statutes and by electoral incentives. See Simons, supra note 3, at
930.
132. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all United
States Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013),
https://bit.ly/3a0n1vf [https://perma.cc/HB22-59MC].  This memorandum followed
an announcement in 2009 by then-Attorney General Eric Holder that the Depart-
ment of Justice would not prosecute federal marijuana offenses against persons
complying with state medical marijuana laws. See Memorandum from David W.
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blueprint for federal decision making in the prosecution of crimes
with concurrent state jurisdiction.  The memorandum makes clear
that the federal government retains the ability to prosecute drug
offenses where federal law criminalizes the underlying behavior.
But the memorandum also assured state and local jurisdictions that,
absent particular federal interests as outlined in a handful of spe-
cific categories, the federal government would not prosecute canna-
bis offenses in states that had determined to legalize its use.133
Implementing similar federal DOJ guidelines could constrain
federal prosecution to situations where federal interests are sub-
stantial.134  Here, the state and local interest in operating safe con-
sumption site is considerable.  First, and most importantly, safe
consumption sites are empirically supported.135  If states and locali-
ties are to serve as “laboratories of democracy,” it makes less sense
for them to run experiments resulting in greater harm; that is
neither the intent nor the reality of supervised consumption sites.
Second, if the states and localities were operating in an area prima-
rily considered a federal sphere, it would not make sense for the
federal government to refrain from enforcement.  Here, states and
localities—bearing the burden of dealing with the harms of sub-
stance use disorders—clearly are trying to protect the health and
welfare of their citizens, which is something primarily considered a
state function.136
Further, federal prosecution guidelines have downsides:  they
may be difficult for the DOJ to enforce against regional prosecu-
tors, and they do not bind future administrations.137  Safe consump-
tion sites would not open with the security of no future prosecution
or injunction.  Importantly, the smaller scale of supervised con-
sumption sites (which would make the sites easier to prosecute)
may lower the risk of establishing programs—there are fewer re-
sources invested in these programs, and they are not envisioned as
revenue generators.
There are also legislative routes to resolving the federalism is-
sues.  Such solutions would resolve issues directly in ways that
would not be as vulnerable to particular presidential administra-
Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Selected U.S. Attorneys, Investigations and Prose-
cutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), https://
bit.ly/2PhdFDe [https://perma.cc/7BMG-738L].
133. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 132.
134. See id.
135. See supra notes 43, 49, and works cited therein.
136. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.
137. See Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s
New Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 634 (2011).
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tions or election cycles.  Congress can determine not to appropriate
money for prosecutions related to safe consumption site operations
where sites comply with state law, as it has done with respect to
marijuana prosecutions.138  Congress could not only withhold
money from “federal crack house” statute prosecutions of super-
vised consumption facilities but could also bar the federal govern-
ment from using federal funds to thwart state supervised
consumption regimes.  Congress can go a step further and enact leg-
islation that would forbid federal prosecutors from targeting safe
consumption sites in states that have made them legal.  The
Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States
(“STATES”) Act, for example, represents a sensible approach if
utilized in the opioid context.  This act—sponsored by Senators
Elizabeth Warren and Cory Gardner—would exempt from federal
law enforcement any individuals or corporations that are in compli-
ance with state cannabis law in possession, production, distribution,
or sales (even where those entities would otherwise be in violation
of federal law).139  The STATES Act has not yet passed as of this
publication, but, as a bill with bipartisan sponsors, it represents
Congress’s willingness to permit states to retain/regain authority to
address drug use within their borders.  Similar legislation could ex-
empt from the CSA and the “federal crack house” statute (to the
extent that courts ultimately hold it applies) safe consumption sites
that are compliant with state law.
If anything, the arguments in favor of permitting states and lo-
calities to experiment with safe consumption sites are more persua-
sive than those in favor of permitting them to legalize marijuana.
The scale of the enterprise contemplated is much smaller than the
billion-dollar recreational marijuana industry.  States that have le-
galized recreational sales boast large numbers of marijuana retail-
ers.140  States that permit medical use of marijuana also offer long
138. See Maura Dolan, Feds Can’t Spend Money to Prosecute People Who
Comply with State Medical Pot Laws, Court Rules, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016, 1:20
PM),  http://lat.ms/2P3r8OX [https://perma.cc/FQ5W-JXA9] (noting that Congress
has barred the federal government from spending money in a manner that would
foil state medical marijuana laws).
139. See Sen. Elizabeth Warren & Sen. Cory Gardner, The STATES Act,
ELIZABETH WARREN, https://bit.ly/31XLcra [https://perma.cc/DR3Y-5BP4] (last
visited Dec. 29, 2019).
140. See, e.g., Thomas Mitchell, Colorado Cannabis Dispensary Counter:
Growth from 2014 to 2018, WESTWORD (Denver) (Jan. 15, 2018, 8:12 AM), https://
bit.ly/2HsBVOH [https://perma.cc/VP59-C5SQ] (noting that Colorado had 509 re-
tail cannabis dispensaries as of 2018).
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lists of available outlets.141  In contrast, most states where super-
vised consumption sites are being considered envision one or two
pilot locations in the state’s largest urban centers.142  While states
have an incentive to expand legal cannabis because of the tax reve-
nue legalization states currently enjoy, there is no serious argument
that states wish to encourage opioid use (or misuse) through the
establishment of safe consumption sites.  Rather, states and locali-
ties are responding to extraordinary, concerning overdose numbers
with a public policy supported by empirical evidence that it will re-
duce the number of deaths and ameliorate the amount of collateral
harm associated with opioid use.
One significant countervailing argument is that legalized mari-
juana regimes typically involve extensive state regulation and over-
sight, which diminishes a federal need to be involved in state affairs.
Even if marijuana poses a less compelling threat to public health
than do opioids (although this may not be reflected in either his-
toric federal drug enforcement priorities or the classification of ma-
rijuana as a schedule one drug under the CSA), states have
developed legal regimes to oversee the cannabis enterprise.  The
movement towards safe consumption sites is less uniform and cen-
tralized; in Philadelphia, the proposed safe consumption site is be-
ing initiated by a nonprofit organization while the state merely
permits it to proceed.143  To the extent the federal government wor-
ries about ad hoc local efforts undermining federal drug policy, the
lack of structure might fuel concern.
The federal government—and state governments wishing to
exercise authority over local affairs—also has fewer practical con-
straints on its ability to prosecute safe-consumption-site-related of-
fenses than it has had with respect to marijuana offenses.  The
federal government’s efforts to use its authority to interfere with
marijuana legalization were foiled, at least in part, because of the
141. The Washington State Department of Health, for example, lists at least
186 retailers in Washington state. See Marijuana Retail Stores with Medical En-
dorsement List, WASH. STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH (Dec. 2019), https://bit.ly/
31ZQMJG [https://perma.cc/F9UY-J5BC]; see also Rick Aaron, Utah to Get 14
Cannabis Dispensaries, but Where Will They Be Located?, ABC4 NEWS (Sept. 17,
2019, 5:27 PM), https://bit.ly/39H4gMW [https://perma.cc/J22R-L8TR].  Utah,
which has more recently authorized medical dispensaries only, will have 14 outlets
by the time such dispensaries are legal in March of 2020. Id.
142. See, e.g., Dominic Fracassa, California Bill Allowing San Francisco Safe
Injection Site Reintroduced, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 4, 2019, 8:44 PM), https://bit.ly/2SSr-
sky [https://perma.cc/H84H-7TSN] (noting that state legislation to permit safe con-
sumption site contemplates a single site in San Francisco).
143. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
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proliferation of marijuana distributors.144  Marijuana legalization
enjoys broad public approval;145 safe consumption sites rest on a
more fragile foundation of support.146  Still, when the federal gov-
ernment was involving itself in state medical marijuana efforts in
the late 1990s, public support for legalizing marijuana was similarly
underwater.147  Prosecution has not yet eliminated the harms of
opioid use disorder, and while past drug epidemics were largely
linked in the public imagination to disfavored subgroups, now there
appears to be more awareness that substance use disorder cuts
across race and class.148  The Trump administration is already under
fire for failing to take sufficient action to combat opioid use disor-
ders.149  Between the departure of personnel like Jeff Sessions, who
seemed more intent on re-waging the war on drugs,150 the initiation
of impeachment proceedings151 that may absorb the DOJ, and pub-
lic discontent with the administration’s opioid efforts, it is possible
that the administration could be persuaded to stand down from op-
posing safe consumption sites.  Whether or not the current adminis-
tration’s law-and-order turn constrains an impetus to limit
144. See supra note 59, at 439.
145. At this point, two-thirds of Americans support legalizing marijuana. See
Andrew Daniller, Two-Thirds of Americans Support Marijuana Legalization, PEW
RES. CTR. (Nov. 14, 2019), https://pewrsr.ch/2uTDMJo [https://perma.cc/EV5S-
Z8CG] (noting that at this point only 8% of Americans think marijuana should be
illegal for use in all circumstances).
146. Twenty-nine percent of Americans approve of creating safe consumption
sites in their communities. See Emma E. McGinty et al., Public Support for Safe
Consumption Sites and Syringe Service Programs to Combat the Opioid Epidemic,
111 PREV. MED. 73, 74 (2018).
147. In 1999, only 31 percent of Americans supported legalizing marijuana.
See supra note 145.
148. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Ashley Parker & Felicia Sonmez, Trump Defends Administra-
tion’s Response to Opioid Crisis: “We Will Never Stop Until Our Job Is Done”,
WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2019, 10:53 AM), https://wapo.st/32aC171 [https://perma.cc/
LJP7-V65J] (noting that the administration had been criticized for supplying insuf-
ficient funding to treatment programs); Alexander Mallin, Despite Gains, Trump
Administration Response to Opioid Crisis Still Faces Criticism, ABC NEWS (Mar. 4,
2018, 1:08 PM), https://abcn.ws/39LtidT [https://perma.cc/8D2E-2PJ3].
150. See Rakesh Sharma, What Does the Departure of Jeff Sessions Mean for
the Cannabis Industry, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://bit.ly/2wruiWJ
[https://perma.cc/222X-KMJF] (noting that cannabis stocks surged after Session’s
departure because of his positions on cannabis); Peter Baker et al., Jeff Sessions is
Forced Out as Attorney General as Trump Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7,
2018), https://nyti.ms/2V45kGT [https://perma.cc/F38M-XYKZ] (indicating Ses-
sions was an advocate for tougher criminal sentencing).
151. See Nicholas Fandos & Michael D. Shear, Trump Impeached for Abuse
of Power and Obstruction of Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2019), https://nyti.ms/
2v2rzIV [https://perma.cc/E2NN-W8VX].
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prosecutorial discretion, future administrations are likely to be
more open.
In spite of similar federal scheduling, however, the general
consensus would likely be that opioid misuse poses a greater public
health threat than marijuana consumption.  Certainly, there have
been historic concerns about the effects of marijuana use; mari-
juana continues to be characterized by some as a gateway drug that
leads to more serious drug use.  Even under legalization regimes,
states continue to worry about cannabis use by minors and motor
vehicle operation by people under the influence.  Still, it is not a
particularly controversial assertion that the dangers of opioid mis-
use exceed those of marijuana use.  Therefore, the federal govern-
ment might be more justified in interfering with state and local
experimentation.  Simply put, the stakes may be higher.
Nevertheless, even to the extent the federal government dis-
agrees with the concept of supervised consumption sites (from both
a moral and empirical perspective), there is no serious suggestion
that states or localities are actually interested in encouraging or ex-
panding injection drug use.  Federal authorities may believe that
supervised consumption sites tacitly lend government approval of
drug use or encourage satellite crimes.  But there is no actual alle-
gation that the individuals who operate supervised consumption
sites do so because they wish to encourage substance use disorders.
Rather, federal disapproval of supervised consumption sites stems
from policy disagreement.  The current presidential administration
has clearly articulated its position:  supervised consumption sites
will not sufficiently link substance use disorders to treatment and
are at odds with a message and practice of abstinence.152  But the
goals of the federal, state, and local governments are all aligned.
They all seek to eradicate opioid substance use disorder.  The ques-
tion is how best to do so, not whether.
Under such circumstances, it makes sense to respect the model
of federalism that permits state and local governments to engage in
experimentation to protect the welfare of residents.153  As I have
noted, the federal government is not constitutionally or doctrinally
constrained from intervention.154  Unlike in the marijuana legaliza-
tion context, the federal government probably has the resources to
shut down safe consumption.155  However, it should step back and
disengage from criminal law enforcement under circumstances
152. See supra notes 52–75 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
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where it ordinarily would not intervene and where state and local
governments are engaged in policymaking intended to promote the
health and well-being of their citizens.  The federal government
should do so even where, as here, it sincerely disagrees with the
policy.  Further, the case for disengagement here is strengthened by
the federal government’s lack of willingness thus far to pass com-
prehensive policy to address substance use disorder.
CONCLUSION
States and localities currently face a major impediment to in-
troducing harm-reduction strategies to ameliorate the effects of
substance use disorder.  It is easy for states and localities to decide
to prosecute or incarcerate themselves out of a perceived opioid
crisis.  But moving forward with a public-health-oriented strategy,
like a supervised consumption site, requires all levels of govern-
ment to agree not to prosecute, even under circumstances where
the federal government generally would not intervene.  Even if a
state decides to permit or promote safe consumption sites, localities
may balk and try to prosecute.156  All of this pressure perversely
favors expensive punitive approaches, even though so far there is
scant evidence that such approaches have curtailed the harms of
substance use.157  It is time for a different approach.
Changing this landscape to permit state and local experimenta-
tion will take persuasion and work, but it is within the realm of
possibility.  Twenty years ago, punitive, criminal-law approaches
were the default to perceived social problems.  This is especially
true with substance use, which spawned an entire critical literature
regarding the one-way ratchet of criminal law.158  Enthusiasm for
criminal law approaches has waned for a variety of reasons, and
substantial criminal justice reforms over the past several years sig-
156. In states that have legalized marijuana, for example, some localities nev-
ertheless have banned marijuana dispensaries. See Robert Mikos, Marijuana Lo-
calism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 719, 720 (2015).  Given the experience in
Washington state where several localities have banned safe consumption sites (see
note 79 supra), even if a state wished affirmatively to promote safe consumption
sites, presumably people using and supervising such sites still could be subject to
criminal sanctions.
157. See generally Section IV supra (explaining how perverse dynamics of fed-
eralism empower states when they behave punitively but not when the behave in a
harm-reduction mode).
158. For a representative article in this genre, see Eric Luna, The Over-
criminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 719 (2005) (arguing that
criminal law expands because politicians have an incentive to criminalize but not
to decriminalize).
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nal an openness to alternatives.159  States and localities, whether
out of optimism or desperation, are at least partially open to the
harm-reduction approaches advocates have promoted for decades.
It is time to adjust the perverse dynamics of federalism to en-
courage communities to implement empirically supported strategies
to minimize the harms of substance use.  It is no longer efficient to
throw the same old criminal law at the wall, hoping to get a differ-
ent result.
159. See generally supra note 5 (forthcoming 2020).
